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Slavery in Kentucky: A Civil War Casualty* 
Lowell H. Harrison 
Slavery existed in Kentucky from its first days of settlement, and 
the 1792 constitution recognized and protected the institution. The 
state's slave population increased more rapidly than the white 
population until 1830, when it reached 24 percent of the total. The 
percentage declined to 19.5 in 1860, although the 225,483 reported 
that year was the largest number in the state's history. While 28 
percent of the white families owned slaves in 1850, only 5 of the 
38,385 individual owners held as many as 100. The average owner 
held 5.4 slaves, the smallest number in the slave states except for 
Missouri .1 
Antislavery sentiment also existed in Kentucky from its early 
days of statehood, but the opponents of slavery were able to 
accomplish little. Slavery's future was discussed at length in the 
1849 constitutional convention, but the final document declared 
that "the right of property is before and higher than any 
constitutional sanction, and the right of an owner of a slave to his 
property is the same and as inviolate as the right of an owner of 
any property whatsoever." As one defender of slavery put it, "We 
promised to fix the constitution so that a majority could not 
oppress a minority, and we have done so. "2 
When the Civil War began, Kentucky was one of the four slave 
states that remained in the Union. For several months she 
maintained a precarious neutrality, but by September 1861 the 
Bluegrass State was a participant in the conflict. Despite postwar 
legends, there is no doubt but that a majority of Kentuckians 
favored the Union. Yet if there was a typical Kentucky voter in 
1861, he supported the Union, believed in states' rights, and 
condoned slavery. 
Thus there was general outrage in the state when General John 
C. Fremont on 30 August 1861 issued an order to confiscate the 
property and free the slaves of disloyal Missourians. When 
*This paper was originally presented at the Symposium in Honor of Dr. 
Thomas D . Clark, University of Kentucky, 10 November 1981. 
32 THE KENTUCKY REVIEW 
d 
te 
h.e 
d 
~r 
is 
e 
re 
President Lincoln directed its withdrawal, he explained that the 
policy would " ... perhaps ruin our rather fair prospects for 
Kentucky."3 But Lincoln soon came under heavy pressure from 
antislavery advocates, and the existence of the peculiar institution 
in some loyal states embarrassed the president. 
In a 3 December 1861 message to Congress Lincoln suggested 
that the general government might provide some compensation for 
states which freed their slaves. Emancipation might be followed by 
colonization "at some place or places in a climate congenial to 
them . . .. "4 His suggestion was ignored by Congress, but on 6 
March 1862 Lincoln presented a more definite program. As he 
sought support for it, he added details. If a state set a definite date 
for the end of slavery-say, 1 January 1882-he would recommend 
a payment of $400 per slave in U.S. 6 percent bonds. The 432,622 
slaves in the loyal states could be freed for $173,000,000, the 
approximate cost of 87 days of the war. Lincoln argued that his 
proposal would shorten the war, for the Confederacy would have 
to abandon any hope that the loyal slave states would join the 
C.S.A.5 
The president had failed to get a vote on compensated 
emancipation in the Delaware legislature, but he placed his hopes 
on Kentucky. His native state had more slaves than the other three 
combined, and if she accepted the plan, surely the others would 
follow suit. But if he expected an enthusiastic response from 
Kentucky, the president was soon disappointed. Most Kentuckians 
believed that the federal government had no constitutional right to 
interfere with slavery in the states, and they were alarmed by and 
resentful of Lincoln's plan. They were fighting for the preservation 
of the Union, not the destruction of slavery. The Covington 
Journal spoke for the majority of Kentuckians when it denied that 
slavery was the cause of the war: "Upon the same reasoning the 
timber of a house is the cause of the fire, and not the incendiary 
who fired it."6 Kentuckians blamed both the abolitionists and the 
secessionists for the plight of the country, and they feared that 
Lincoln was being prodded into an antislavery position. 'The 
extreme men of the Republican party are advancing step by step to 
the accomplishment of their long cherished purpose," a northern 
Kentucky editor warned. 'The more moderate men of the party 
follow on, feebly protesting as they advance, but occupying today 
the ground that the radicals left yesterday. "7 
One irate citizen figured that the cost in Kentucky would be 
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$100,000,000, a prohibitive sum. But that was beside the point, he 
insisted, for Kentuckians did not want emancipation and would 
oppose it. "Let them understand," he warned the abolitionists, 
"that whenever they attempt this outrage upon humanity, the 
Kentucky soldiery, who are now fighting in the Federal army, will 
lay down their arms, or use them in defense of all they hold dear 
on earth . ... "8 
A particular fear was that emancipation would increase the 
number of free blacks in the state. Restrictive laws had held the 
total in 1860 to only 10,684-less than one percent of the 
population. In December 1861 when emancipation was suggested, 
a Louisville editor declared that if the slaves were freed 200,000 
soldiers would be required "to retain Kentucky in the Union, and 
then the soldiers would be compelled to aid in exterminating the 
black race. " If the slaves were freed, he asserted, "there is but one 
thing to be done with them; they must be wiped out-totally 
obliterated. It must be a merciless, savage extermination. . . . The 
two races . . . cannot exist in the same country, unless the black 
race is in slavery."9 
The protests at home were echoed by the Kentuckians' elected 
representatives. In Congress John J. Crittenden, the aged 
compromiser, asked that his state be left alone to determine her 
own policy: "We have given you all the assurances [of loyalty] 
that ought to be asked:" He did not fault Lincoln's intentions ("' 
believe he means right. .. . "), but the president was wrong in his 
request. 10 A member of the Kentucky House was so incensed that 
he introduced a draconian measure requiring that "any person or 
persons who have or who may advocate the doctrine of the 
abolition or emancipation of slavery . .. either directly or 
indirectly, or who sympathizes with the same, be and are hereby, 
disfranchised for life." Such offenders also had to leave the state 
within ten days. Despite the measure's obvious unconstitutionality, 
it passed the House 48 to 29. 11 
Despite such negative responses, Lincoln returned to his 
proposal during the summer of 1862. By then Congress had 
abolished slavery in the District of Columbia and the territories, 
measures that aroused deep apprehension in Kentucky. On 
Saturday morning, 12 July, Lincoln met with the senators and 
representatives from the loyal slave states. Reading from a 
prepared statement, the president asserted that "I intend no 
reproach or complaint, when I assure you that, in my opinion, if 
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you all had voted for the resolution in the general emancipation of 
last March, the war would now be substantially ended . . . . " 
Their refusal to end slavery had encouraged the rebellious states to 
believe that they might still be joined by the loyal slave states. The 
lever of power in the South was slavery, Lincoln argued; break 
that lever and the rebellion would end. If the rebellion continued, 
he warned, "the institution in your States will be extinguished by 
mere friction and abrasion-by the mere incidents of the war. .. 
How much better for you, and for your people, to take the step 
which, at once, shortens the war and secures substantial 
compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other 
event. "12 
In the ensuing discussion Lincoln stressed again that what he 
proposed was gradual, compensated emancipation followed by 
colonization, but he had to admit that Congress had not approved 
the plan or made financial provision for it. With Kentucky 
Representative Charles A . Wickliffe of Bardstown as chairman, the 
group replied on 14 July. They rejected the proposal, presented in 
"undue haste," that would drastically alter their social system. 
Slavery was a state matter, and their states did not choose to 
abandon it. They insisted that Lincoln's proposal would lengthen 
the war because it would unify the Southerners and spur them on 
to greater effort. While they pledged their support to winning the 
war, they requested that the president confine himself to his proper 
constitutional roleY 
Representative Samuel L. Casey from the First District was the 
only Kentuckian to sign a minority report which called for 
Lincoln's proposal to be submitted to their states . Pointing out that 
the Confederates had considered ending slavery in return for 
foreign recognition, the minority asserted that "if they can give up 
slavery to destroy the Union, we can surely ask our people to 
consider the question of emancipation to save the Union ."14 
But the large majority of Kentuckians did not need to consider 
it. The president had declared in his inaugural address: "I have no 
purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of 
slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful 
right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." They 
continued to cling to that position after Lincoln abandoned it. 
The compensated emancipation issue was soon overshadowed 
by the Emancipation Proclamation. Issued in preliminary form by 
President Lincoln on 22 September 1862, the proclamation was to 
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take effect on 1 January 1863. That it did not apply to Kentucky 
was of little matter; many Kentuckians saw it as portending the 
ultimate fate of slavery in their state . "It is a most abominable, 
infamous document," wrote a Kentucky soldier in the Union army. 
"We find ourselves in arms to maintain doctrines, which, if 
announced 12 months ago, would have driven us all . .. into the 
ranks of the Southern Army. "15 The editor of the Frankfort 
Commonwealth was almost incoherent with rage. 'The President's 
nigger proclamation ought to be crammed down his throat, if he 
will not withdraw it, as a flagrant violation of his official 
oath . . . . "16 A Louisville editor wrote that "if this rebellion is not 
put down, the fault will be at the door of a party that has 
abandoned the idea of doing that work, and gives its sole attention 
to abolishing slavery."17 In March 1863 the legislature passed a law 
that in effect enslaved any black entering the state who claimed 
freedom under the Emancipation Proclamation. 
The Union army presented a more immediate threat to 
Kentucky slavery. Commanders used slaves for military projects, 
and some abolitionist officers used every possible means to 
interfere with the detested institution. Even loyal owners found 
their slaves impressed for construction work or as teamsters. 
Payment was often delayed or denied, and Confederate 
sympathizers rarely got a hearing. The reaction was so adverse 
that by December 1862 General H. B. Wright was convinced that 
at least two-thirds of the legislature favored secession and would 
proclaim it if given an opportunity to do so .18 
The administration's decision to use black troops angered 
Kentuckians even more than the earlier measures, for it challenged 
the basic assumption that blacks were inherently inferior to whites . 
But with a substantial number of Kentuckians in Confederate 
service, the state had difficulty in meeting its manpower quotas . 
The pool of black males was the only practical means of making 
up the deficit. Lincoln tried to ease the initial shock by ordering 
that only free Negroes be enrolled and by explaining that 
enrollment did not mean immediate enlistment. Even so, the state 
protests were so violent that the order was suspended until 
February 1864. 
But by then the need was so great that black males in Kentucky 
were ordered enrolled, slaves as well as freedmen. Few 
Kentuckians attempted to defend the policy; even devoted 
Unionists denounced it. Colonel Frank Wolford, commander of the 
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Camp Nelson , Kentucky , where black soldiers were mustered in and out of the Union Army, circa 1864 
famed "Wild Riders" of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry, promised to use 
his troops to prevent black enlistments. Wolford was arrested but 
denied a trial for fear it would make him a public martyr. Instead, 
he was dishonorably discharged from the army that he had served 
so well. Governor T. E. Bramlette had given lukewarm support to 
the administration on the grounds that the sooner the war ended, 
the sooner the Lincoln government could be discarded. Now, the 
governor swore, "If the president does not, upon my demand, stop 
the negro enrollment, I will."19 But after a confusing series of 
mysterious conferences that included such staunch Unionists as the 
Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge and General Stephen G. Burbridge, the 
governor urged his people to limit their protests to lawful forms. 
A few days later Lincoln assured Bramlette and a small delegation 
that no blacks would be enlisted in any county that met its quota 
with whites and that enlisted blacks would be trained out of 
state. 20 
Quotas were still not met, and on 15 April 1864 General 
Burbridge ordered the enlistment of black males, slave as well as 
free. Loyal owners were to be paid as much as $300 per slave, a 
figure well below pre-war prices. When the initial rush of black 
volunteers subsided, recruitment officers struck a heavy blow at 
Kentucky slavery by actively seeking slaves for military service. 
The 1864 presidential election gave Kentucky voters an 
opportunity to indicate their opinion of Lincoln and his policies. 
George B. McClellan got 64,546 votes to 27,797 for Lincoln. A few 
days later Frank Wolford, Lt. Governor R. T. Jacob, and Paul R. 
Shipman of the Louisville Journal were arrested for trying to 
obstruct black enlistments and ordered banished to the 
Confederacy. Faced with passionate protests, Lincoln pardoned 
them, but the state was so outraged that in December a War 
Department agent warned that "a large majority of Kentuckians 
are today undoubtedly disloyal."21 
Removal of the detested Burbridge relieved the tension but did 
not alter the administration's determination to end slavery. General 
John M. Palmer was less obnoxious than his predecessor, but he 
was equally determined to secure black enlistments. An act of 3 
March 1865 freed the wives and children of blacks who enlisted, 
and Palmer admitted, as the war drew to a close, that the army 
was more interested in enlisting blacks in order to free them than 
in obtaining soldiers. Some 20,000 Kentucky blacks were in 
uniform by the end of the war, and about 9,000 others were 
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enlisted later. 22 Kentucky supplied nearly as many blacks to the 
Union army as it did whites to the Confederate forces . As a result 
of this policy, slaveholders saw the number of slaves decrease 
sharply and the value of the remainder decline like the price of 
Confederate bonds. Any realistic assessment of slavery had to 
conclude that its end was near. 
The finish was, of course, provided by the Thirteenth 
Amendment, to which Lincoln had turned as the final solution to 
the slavery question. The proposal finally secured Congressional 
approval in January 1865 and was submitted to the states for 
ratification. George Prentice, editor of the Louisville Journal, was 
one of the few prominent Kentuckians who supported it. Governor 
Bramlette realized that the end of slavery was near, but he hoped 
to secure the compensated emancipation and colonization that 
Lincoln had suggested nearly three years earlier. When he 
transmitted the proposed amendment to the legislature on 8 
February 1865, Bramlette declared flatly that "no intelligent man, 
whatever may be his desires upon the subject, can hope for the 
perpetuation of slavery in Kentucky. . . . the facts exist and cannot 
be changed by denying them or closing our eyes to their existence. 
Whether the proposed amendment be ratified by you or not, 
slavery has been fore-doomed by rebellion, and cannot be 
maintained ." But then he marred his realism by recommending 
that ratification be made contingent upon the federal government 
paying Kentucky $34,179,246, the 1864 assessed value of the 
slaves. 23 But the day was long gone when a Kentucky slaveholder 
might have secured compensation, and the governor's pipe dream 
was ignored. By votes of 56 to 28 and 21 to 12 the House and 
Senate rejected the amendment. 
Later efforts to secure ratification also failed, and Kentucky 
retained slavery as the Thirteenth Amendment moved steadily 
toward ratification. Newspapers continued to carry notices of slave 
sales, but prices were only a fraction of what they had been a few 
years earlier. General Palmer issued travel passes lavishly, and 
thousands of blacks flocked into the state's cities or crossed the 
Ohio in search of greater opportunities . In July Palmer estimated 
that 100,863 persons had been freed through the military route and 
that half of the remaining 129,000 had been freed through other 
means. 24 The remaining 65,000 slaves were less than 30 percent of 
the 1860 total. Eager to end slavery for all time, Palmer declared 
the Thirteenth Amendment ratified and in force on 7 December 
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1865, eleven days before the secretary of state did so . 
Even then the Kentucky legislature refused to change its stance. 
On 25 January 1866 the House rejected 30 to 57 a motion to ratify 
and declared that "the action of the past Legislature on this subject 
is final. "25 That gesture of defiance meant nothing, unless it 
satisfied some stubborn Kentuckians who insisted upon clinging to 
a discredited institution. Despite their determined efforts, slavery 
in Kentucky had come to an end. It was indeed a Civil War 
casualty. 
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